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COMCAST CORP. V. BEHREND: COMMON 
QUESTIONS VERSUS INDIVIDUAL 
ANSWERS—WHICH WILL PREDOMINATE? 
Daniel Jacobs* 
I.  WEIGHING IN 
In Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,1 the Supreme Court decertified a 
class exceeding two million previous and current Comcast 
subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA)2 that 
accused Comcast of engaging in anticompetitive conduct violating 
the Sherman Act.3 A district court certified the class pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 23(b)(3),4 and the Third 
Circuit affirmed.5 The same five-member majority as in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,6 in an opinion written by the same Supreme 
Court Justice who had penned the majority opinion in Wal-Mart held 
that the district court had not used enough scrutiny when determining 
whether class certification was appropriate.7 
Part II provides a brief primer on class action procedure 
followed by a glance at the relatively recent change in the Court’s 
approach to class action certification manifested in its seminal  
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Philosophy, 
University of Washington, 2011. I wish to sincerely thank Professor Georgene Vairo, who first 
sparked my interest in class action litigation and mass dispute resolution, and whose guidance this 
Comment would not have been completed without. I would be remiss to not thank Julia Johnson, 
whose constant support and patience made this Comment possible. 
 1. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 2. The Philadelphia DMA consists of eighteen counties in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and 
New Jersey. See id. at 1430 n.1. DMA is a term used “to define a broadcast-television market.” 
Id. 
 3. Id. at 1429–30. 
 4. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). While class actions can be and are utilized in state courts 
pursuant to state procedural rules, this Comment limits its discussion to class actions in the 
federal courts. 
 5. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426 
(2013). 
 6. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 7. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–33. 
COMCAST CORP. V. BEHREND 9/25/2014 5:05 PM 
506 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:505 
 
Wal-Mart decision.8 Part III discusses the factual and procedural 
background of Comcast by examining what occurred in the district 
court and the Third Circuit.9 Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
majority and dissenting opinions.10 Part V continues with the brunt 
of this Comment’s argument11 before briefly concluding.12 
Comcast sought review to resolve whether a court can certify a 
class without resolving “merits arguments” that pertain to the class 
certification prerequisites pursuant to Rule 23.13 The Court granted 
certiorari to resolve whether a court can certify a class without 
determining whether the party seeking class certification has 
introduced admissible evidence sufficient to show compliance with 
Rule 23.14 The majority opinion then answered a slightly different 
question, focusing on whether admissible evidence had been 
introduced to show compliance with a requirement for (b)(3) classes 
in an antitrust context.15 
Given this odd series of events surrounding the question to be 
addressed by the Court, it is not surprising that the majority’s answer 
is both confusing and contrary to what has been black-letter law.16 
To get a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the party seeking class 
certification must show that questions relating to the class as a whole 
“predominate” over questions pertaining to individual class 
members.17 Traditionally, individualized damage calculations have 
not been sufficient, by themselves, to prevent satisfaction of 
predominance.18 
In his opinion, Justice Scalia explicitly identifies individualized 
damage calculations as “inevitably” outweighing common questions, 
thus precluding (b)(3) predominance.19 However, the majority 
opinion makes no mention of changing black-letter law, and instead 
 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. See infra Part VI. 
 13. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1431 n.4 (majority opinion). 
 16. See infra Part V. 
 17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 18. See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:54 (5th ed. 2013). 
 19. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
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claims its decision is a “straightforward application of class-
certification principles.”20 By applying class action principles to 
reach a decision that is facially contradictory black-letter law, the 
Comcast Court left class action jurisprudence with another 
unanswered question: What is the relationship between 
individualized damages and predominance in (b)(3) classes?21 
This Comment argues that the majority opinion has created 
uncertainty in the federal courts because it is poorly drafted, and this 
inattention to detail will eventually require Supreme Court 
clarification.22 By analyzing two class actions involving Whirlpool 
washing machines23 that were remanded to the circuit courts for 
reconsideration in light of Comcast, this Comment closes by showing 
how circuits around the country are reacting to the decision and 
using issue classes24 to avoid the confusion the opinion created.25 
II.  PRIMER AND WAL-MART 
A.  What Is a Class Action? 
A class action is a mechanism whereby one individual can 
participate in court on behalf of a large group of individuals, in 
contrast to the general rule that litigation shall be done on an 
individual basis.26 To proceed in this collective form of litigation, the 
party seeking to have the class certified must satisfy Rule 23 
requirements.27 
Rule 23(a) sets out four elements that the party seeking class 
certification must demonstrate to get the class certified: numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.28 
Numerosity requires the class to be too large for all members to be 
 
 20. See id. 
 21. This Comment makes no attempt to answer this question. This Comment instead focuses 
on how the Court managed to “un-answer” a question that many had thought was already 
resolved. 
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Whirlpool Corp. 
Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 24. Issue class refers to a class that is certified only regarding a particular issue in the 
dispute. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
 25. See infra Part V.B. 
 26. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432. 
 27. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011). 
 28. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550. 
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joined via traditional mechanisms.29 Commonality requires the entire 
class to share common “questions of law or fact.”30 Typicality 
requires the class representative to share legal claims or defenses 
with the class as a whole.31 Adequacy of representation requires the 
class representative to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class.”32 
In addition to the requirements laid out in 23(a),33 a party 
seeking class certification must also satisfy one of the three 
provisions set out in 23(b), depending on both the underlying claims 
and the relief sought.34 The first two provisions are intended for 
classes seeking primarily injunctive or declaratory relief, while the 
third provision is meant for classes seeking monetary damages.35 
To certify a class pursuant to 23(b)(3),36 the party seeking class 
certification must show that those questions common to the class 
“predominate over any questions affecting only individual class 
members”37 and that using a class action is the “superior” method of 
resolving or addressing the dispute.38 The rule goes on to list four 
non-exhaustive factors that are to be considered when making both 
the predominance and the superiority determinations,39 but most 
courts use the four factors solely in the superiority analysis.40 
The importance of the Court’s decision in Comcast can only be 
fully appreciated once viewed as part of a trend toward an ever-rising 
burden that parties seeking class certification must meet. The next 
section examines the emergence of this “‘rigorous analysis’”41 and 
 
 29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see infra Part II.B.2. 
 31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3); JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 4:16 (2012). 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 33. Some courts have held, as an unwritten threshold requirement to class certification, that 
the class must be ascertainable, namely that there be some sort of mechanism to determine who is 
a class member and who is not. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 18, §§ 3:2, 3:3. 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 35. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.221 (4th ed., 2004). 
 36. Because the class at issue in Comcast was a (b)(3) class, this Comment will limit its 
discussion to (b)(3) classes. 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 18, § 4:68. 
 40. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 18, § 4:68. 
 41. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of 
Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982)). 
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what class certification looked like before and after the Court’s 
decision in Wal-Mart. 
B.  Landscape 
The party seeking class certification has the burden of 
demonstrating to the court that the putative class satisfied the Rule 
23 requirements.42 Because the class action is merely a procedural 
tool for pursuing claims based on substantive law, the evidence 
pertaining to those claims is theoretically distinct from the evidence 
demonstrating the propriety of class certification.43 A problem arises 
when the evidence overlaps, and thus the question becomes whether, 
and to what extent, the merits-related evidence can be examined in 
the class certification inquiry. 
1.  Pre-Wal-Mart 
The Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Eisen v. Jacquelin & 
Carlisle44 included a statement45 that courts interpreted for many 
years to mean that consideration of the merits, and in turn, evidence 
relating to such merits, is flatly prohibited during the class 
certification decision.46 In 1982, the Supreme Court explicitly stated 
that this blanket prohibition was not the rule,47 but the Court’s earlier 
statement seemed to have more staying power. 
2.  Wal-Mart 
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court decertified a class of 1.5 
million female Wal-Mart employees suing Wal-Mart for alleged 
gender discrimination in its promotion practices.48 The Court held 
that the class should not have been certified because, among other 
failings, the class did not satisfy the commonality requirement.49 
 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (“A party seeking class 
certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with [Rule 23]”). 
 43. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 31, at § 3:12. 
 44. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 45. “We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any 
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it 
may be maintained as a class action.” Id. at 177. 
 46. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION 273–76 (2009). 
 47. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 
 48. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011). 
 49. See id. at 2556–57. 
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Justice Scalia, writing for the five-member majority, explained that 
commonality did not require just common questions of law or fact, 
but rather common answers to those questions.50 Furthermore, a 
common answer must sufficiently connect to the case’s core issues 
so that “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that 
is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”51 
In clarifying that the district court must conduct a “rigorous 
analysis” when examining whether Rule 23 requirements are 
satisfied,52 the Court explained that such rigor would commonly 
require examination of the claim’s underlying merits.53 In a footnote, 
the Court characterized its statement in Eisen as “the purest 
dictum”54 and reiterated that examination of the merits during the 
class inquiry is not only permissible but is in fact frequently 
necessary.55 
3.  Post-Wal-Mart 
Immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision, courts of 
appeal began decertifying previously certified classes claiming that 
the district courts had not conducted sufficiently rigorous scrutiny.56 
Class certification became undoubtedly more difficult, and while 
some courts applied Wal-Mart broadly in decertifying classes,57 
others did everything they could to distinguish the decision with a 
wide enough berth as to deem it inapplicable.58 
 
 50. See id. at 2551 (“‘What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 
“questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate 
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’” (quoting Richard Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009))). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2551–52 (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160). 
 53. Id. 
 54. The Court explained that the statement in Eisen was in a different context. The judge in 
that case had looked at the merits during the class certification stage in order to shift the cost of 
notice from the plaintiff to the defendant. The judge was not looking behind the pleadings in 
order to determine whether class certification was appropriate. Id. at 2552 n.6. 
 55. Id. at 2552 & n.6. 
 56. See M.D. ex rel Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012); Ellis v. Costco 
Wholesale, Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 57. See DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013); In re Countrywide Fin. 
Corp. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 708 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2013); Luiken v. Domino’s Pizza, 
LLC, 705 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 58. See In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2013); Johnson v. 
Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2012); McReynolds v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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III.  IT’S ABOUT THE JOURNEY, NOT THE DESTINATION 
After examining what occurred in the district court, this 
Comment goes on to look at what the Third Circuit did to set the 
stage for the Supreme Court’s decision. 
A.  District Court 
Beginning in 1998, Comcast used a strategy called 
“clustering”59 to increase its subscription rates in the Philadelphia 
area.60 Clustering involves trading geographic regions of the market 
with competitors to solidify control in a particular larger region.61 
Some Comcast subscribers in the Philadelphia DMA sought to 
certify a (b)(3) class62 and recover damages from Comcast as a result 
of this clustering, which they alleged violated antitrust law.63 
According to the subscriber plaintiffs, Comcast’s clustering removed 
competitors from the Philadelphia DMA and maintained prices 
above competitive levels, thus forcing the putative class to pay 
higher rates for cable television, and these higher rates constitute the 
damages alleged.64 
In seeking certification of a (b)(3) class, the plaintiffs needed to 
establish predominance, which, in the antitrust context, requires a 
two-pronged analysis.65 First, the plaintiffs needed to show that the 
antitrust impact66 could be established at trial through evidence 
common to the entire class.67 Second, the plaintiffs needed to show 
that the damages resulting from said antitrust impact could be 
 
 59. Clustering is defined by the majority as “a strategy of concentrating operations within a 
particular region.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1430 (2013). 
 60. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 156–57 (E.D. Pa. 2010), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
1426. 
 61. See Richard A. Epstein, The Precarious Status of Class Action Antitrust Litigation After 
Comcast v. Behrend, POINTOFLAW.COM (Apr. 8, 2013), http://pointoflaw.com/columns/2013/04 
/the-precarious-status-of-class-action-antitrust-litigation-after-comcast-v-behrend.php. 
 62. Judge Padova certified the following class: “All cable television customers who 
subscribe or subscribed at any times since December 1, 1999, to the present to video 
programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its 
subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast’s Philadelphia cluster.” Id. at 191. 
 63. Id. at 156. 
 64. Id. at 156–57. 
 65. Id. at 156. 
 66. “Individual injury (also known as antitrust impact) is an element of the cause of action; 
to prevail on the merits, every class member must prove at least some antitrust impact resulting 
from the alleged violation.” Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 156 (E.D. Penn. 2010). 
 67. See Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 156–57. 
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measured “on a class-wide basis” through use of a “common 
methodology.”68 
The plaintiffs presented four nonexclusive theories of antitrust 
impact in an effort to satisfy the first prong of the predominance 
analysis.69 In the end, the district court certified the class but only 
recognized one of the four theories as being susceptible to class-wide 
proof at trial.70 This theory argued that Comcast’s clustering reduced 
competition from “overbuilders”71 to such a degree as to cross the 
line into violating antitrust law.72 Overbuilders are competitors who 
attempt to provide services in an area that is already dominated by a 
provider. 
The plaintiffs presented a model prepared by Dr. James 
McClave in an attempt to satisfy the second requirement: that 
damages be measurable on a class-wide basis.73 McClave’s model 
used regression analysis to show what prices the putative class 
members would have paid but for Comcast’s allegedly illegal 
clustering and used those prices to determine the damages.74 
However, McClave’s model determined the “what-if” price by 
incorporating all four theories of antitrust impact, not just the 
overbuilder theory accepted for class certification purposes.75 
Moreover, the model did not establish what the damages would be 
using only the overbuilder theory.76 Thus, Comcast argued that the 
model was inadequate to establish that the damages were measurable 
class wide.77 
In granting class certification, the district court specifically 
addressed this feature of the model and held that it did not “impeach” 
 
 68. Id. at 154. 
 69. Id. at 156–57. 
 70. Id. at 191. The court did not reject the other three theories for being implausible or for 
failing to establish antitrust impact, but rather because they were not susceptible to class-wide 
proof. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430–31 & n.3. 
 71. Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 157 (defining the term “overbuilders” as “rival wireline 
providers of multichannel video programming service”). 
 72. See id. at 166–75. 
 73. See id. at 181–83. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 190–91. 
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the model sufficiently to merit denial of class certification.78 
Comcast appealed the class certification to the Third Circuit.79 
B.  Court of Appeals 
On appeal, Comcast emphasized the same issues with 
McClave’s model as it had done in the district court, arguing that the 
model’s failure to identify damages specifically resulting from the 
overbuilder theory meant that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated 
compliance with the predominance analysis’s second prong.80 The 
Third Circuit affirmed the class certification and held that the district 
court had not abused its discretion in certifying the class.81 
After affirming that a court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” 
in determining whether the class certification requirements are met,82 
the Third Circuit cited one of its earlier opinions83 to clarify that 
merits-related inquiry during the class certification stage is 
permissible.84 However, the court went on to say that such inquiry is 
only allowed to the extent necessary to determine Rule 23 
compliance.85 
The court explained that at the class certification stage, the 
plaintiffs did not need to prove the existence of antitrust impact—
only that such impact could be proven at trial through evidence 
common to the entire class.86 The Third Circuit stated that Comcast 
had asked the court to examine the plaintiffs’ evidence to a degree 
that was not required at the class certification stage.87 
In regards to McClave’s model, the Third Circuit explained that 
the model did not need to show what the class-wide damages would 
be but rather only that class-wide damages could be measured using 
a common methodology.88 The Third Circuit stated that Comcast’s 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426. 
 80. See id. at 201–02. 
 81. Id. at 185. 
 82. Id. at 190 (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 
2008)). 
 83. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 84. See Behrend, 655 F.3d at 190. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 197 (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311–12). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 203–04, 207. 
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contentions regarding the model were solely in regard to the study’s 
“merits,” and because the model’s validity did not relate to Rule 23 
compliance, such examination was not warranted during the class 
certification stage.89 The Third Circuit concluded that Comcast’s 
arguments about the model did not relate to the inquiry required 
during the class certification stage,90 and thus the district court had 
not abused its discretion in certifying the class.91 
IV.  THE OPINIONS 
As mentioned earlier, the 5–4 split of the justices in Comcast 
paralleled the split in Wal-Mart,92 which in turn coincides with 
“ideological lines.”93 Before delving into the majority and dissenting 
opinions, it is helpful to briefly discuss the amorphous question 
presented. 
A.  Lack of Common Question Presented 
As this Comment alluded to earlier on,94 Comcast initially asked 
the Court to resolve whether a class can be certified absent resolution 
of “merits arguments” pertinent to Rule 23 compliance.95 The Court 
decided to answer a slightly different question,96 and the oral 
argument consisted almost entirely of a debate about the question 
being asked of the Court.97 As such, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
excoriated the majority for answering a question that had not been 
 
 89. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316–17 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 
U.S. 156, 177 (1974)) (describing the Supreme Court’s rule prohibiting consideration of the 
merits as not “necessary” for purposes of Rule 23). 
 90. See Behrend, 655 F.3d at 206–07. 
 91. Id. at 207. 
 92. Compare Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (exemplifying how these two cases both had the same split 
between the justices in their holdings). 
 93. See Comcast Corp v. Behrend, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF 
LAW (Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_864%23argument 
(sorting the justices’ opinions based on their traditional ideologies). 
 94. See supra Part I. 
 95. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) 
(No. 11-864), 2012 WL 105558, at *i. 
 96. “‘Whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the 
plaintiff class had introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the 
case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.’” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 
S. Ct. 24 (2012). 
 97. Oral Argument, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (No. 11-864), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_864. 
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asked98 and connected this error on the Court’s part to several other 
reasons why certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently 
granted.99 The plasticity of the question presented thus infected the 
majority opinion,100 prompting the majority to devote a footnote to 
addressing the dissenting justices’ concerns.101 
B.  Majority Opinion 
After briefly examining the facts,102 the Court began its analysis 
by identifying the class action as “‘an exception to the usual rule’” of 
individualized litigation.103 Citing to Wal-Mart, the Court reiterated 
that the party seeking class certification must “affirmatively 
demonstrate” compliance with Rule 23 and support such 
demonstrations “through evidentiary proof.”104 
Justice Scalia went on to quote his own opinion in Wal-Mart, 
stating that an inquiry into the merits was not off limits during the 
class certification stage.105 The majority then said that examination 
of the merits during the class certification stage would, in fact, be 
quite common in order for the district court to conduct the required 
rigorous analysis.106 
The Court declared that the class certification by the district 
court was improper, as was the Third Circuit’s affirmation of the 
certification.107 According to the majority, the Third Circuit refused 
to address Comcast’s argument about McClave’s model solely 
because it overlapped with the merits and “simply concluded” that 
McClave’s model demonstrated the second prong of antitrust 
predominance.108 The majority construed this approach as permitting 
“any method of measurement . . . so long as it can be applied 
 
 98. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435–36 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 99. See infra Part IV.C. 
 100. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435–41 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 1431 n.4 (majority opinion). 
 102. Id. at 1429–31. 
 103. Id. at 1432 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). 
 104. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011)). 
 105. Id. at 1432–33. 
 106. See id. at 1432. 
 107. Id. at 1432–33. 
 108. Id. 
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classwide.”109 Justice Scalia warned that this approach would 
“reduce [the] predominance requirement to a nullity.”110 
The majority went on to state that the district court had made an 
erroneous conclusion: McClave’s model failed to establish 
predominance due to its failure to identify damages specifically 
attributable to the overbuilder theory.111 Because the plaintiffs had 
relied solely on McClave’s model to establish the second prong of 
antitrust predominance, the model’s failure meant “individual 
damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to 
the class.”112 
According to the majority, had the plaintiffs won at trial, they 
would only have been entitled to damages resulting from the 
overbuilder-related clustering.113 As such, the Court declared that a 
model purporting to show that damages are measurable on a class-
wide basis should measure only the damages stemming from the 
overbuilder conduct.114 Because McClave’s model did not attempt to 
isolate such calculations, the model could not purport to show that 
damages are measurable class wide under the theory of liability 
remaining in the case.115 
C.  Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion began by clarifying that the majority’s 
reformulation of the question presented was sufficient by itself to 
merit dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted.116 However, the 
new question presented addressed the admissibility of evidence, and 
because Comcast did not object to McClave’s model during the class 
certification stage, the dissent argued that Comcast waived any 
objection to its admission.117 Thus, the dissent identified another 
reason why certiorari should have been dismissed.118 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1433–35. 
 112. Id. at 1433 (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 1433–34. 
 116. Id. at 1435 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 117. See id. at 1435–36. 
 118. Id. at 1436. 
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In addressing the majority opinion, the dissent clarified that the 
Court “breaks no new ground” vis-à-vis (b)(3) class certification.119 
The dissent argued that measurability of class-wide damages through 
a common methodology is not a prerequisite to class certification.120 
Instead, a class could be certified solely for a determination of 
liability,121 leaving the damages calculations to be done on a 
subsequent individual basis.122 
Furthermore, the dissent stated that as a matter of black-letter 
law, individual damages still do not, by themselves, preclude (b)(3) 
certification.123 For the remainder of the dissent, the justices 
criticized the majority’s decision as a matter of substantive antitrust 
law.124 
V.  ANALYSIS 
As this Comment explores below, the majority opinion in 
Comcast significantly distorts what occurred in the lower courts125 
and makes the opinion difficult to interpret and apply due to the use 
of imprecise wording when making important statements of class 
action law.126 Consequently, federal courts have found ways to avoid 
the Comcast confusion through the use of issue classes under (c)(4), 
as exemplified by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in recent decisions 
interpreting Comcast. 127 
A.  Individual Damages Versus Predominance 
1.  Third Circuit Corrected 
The majority repeatedly referred to the Third Circuit’s rubber-
stamping of McClave’s model, as though the Third Circuit made 
some blanket statement about Eisen prohibiting merits-related 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.; see infra Part V.A. 
 121. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1437 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 122. See id. “When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with 
respect to particular issues.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); see infra Part V.B. 
 123. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436–37 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 124. See id. at 1437–41. 
 125. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 126. See infra Part V.A.2. 
 127. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 
2013); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013); see infra Part V.B. 
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inquiries.128 However, the Third Circuit did the exact opposite, 
repeatedly citing to its earlier decision in In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
for the extent to which such a merits-related inquiry is permissible.129 
Furthermore, the Third Circuit did not reject all of Comcast’s 
arguments about McClave’s model—only the ones challenging the 
model’s “methodology.”130 
The Third Circuit did not “simply conclude[]” that McClave’s 
model satisfied the plaintiffs’ burden.131 It identified the specific 
burden on the putative class at that stage132 and determined that 
McClave’s model satisfied that burden.133 The majority made no 
mention of that holding and instead labeled the Third Circuit as 
accepting any possible method of calculation.134 
The majority simply declared that McClave’s model failed to 
establish the second prong of antitrust predominance135 because, if 
used, the model would not accurately predict the class’s damages.136 
This is empirically false. McClave’s model used a formula that 
estimated the entire class’s damages.137 The estimate was bloated 
because the model took account of variables that it should not have 
included.138 However, the model still produced an estimate of class-
wide damages.139 This estimate was all that was required under 
Hydrogen Peroxide,140 which seems to remain good law today. 
2.  Antitrust Predominance or All Predominance? 
The majority stated that predominance was not satisfied because 
individualized calculation of damages “inevitably overwhelm[ed]” 
common class-wide questions.141 This is certainly a correct statement 
 
 128. See supra Part IV.B. 
 129. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426 
(2013). 
 130. See id. at 206–07. 
 131. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
 132. See Behrend, 655 F.3d at 197 (citing In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 
305, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 133. See id. at 199–206. 
 134. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
 135. See id. at 1433–34. 
 136. See id. at 1433–35. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 1438–39 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 1440–41. 
 140. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 141. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
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of law for antitrust class actions, for it reflects the two-pronged 
predominance analysis required in such cases. However, Justice 
Scalia went on to say that the dissent’s discussion of substantive 
antitrust law was unwarranted.142 Thus, the question becomes 
whether “predominance” is meant to refer to antitrust-specific 
predominance or to predominance in all (b)(3) class actions.143 
The dissent stated that the majority’s statements only applied to 
antitrust cases,144 but it is far from clear that Justice Scalia intended 
the statements to be limited in scope. 
The dissent said the black-letter rule remains the same: 
individual damages calculations do not preclude (b)(3) class 
certification.145 Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether the majority in 
Comcast left that intact. However, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
recently made clear that they are not going to wait for an answer and 
have sought to avoid the damages issue entirely through issue 
classes.146 
B.  Front-Loading Washing Machines and Rule 23(c)(4) 
1.  Sixth Circuit 
Two Ohio consumers brought a class action against Whirlpool 
over allegedly defective washing machines that failed to properly 
self-clean, thus resulting in mold buildup in the machine and on 
clothes, leading to various unpleasant cleanliness and respiratory 
issues.147 The district court certified a liability class of Ohio 
consumers and specifically set aside damages determinations for 
after the liability phase.148 Whirlpool appealed the class certification, 
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.149 
Whirlpool appealed to the Supreme Court, which remanded the case 
to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in light of its decision in 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1432. 
 144. See id. at 1440 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 1437. 
 146. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 
2013); Butler v. Sears, Robeuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 147. In re Whirlpool, 722 F.3d at 844. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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Comcast.150 In July 2013, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed the class 
certification, holding that Comcast did not make the class 
certification improper.151 
The Sixth Circuit explained that, unlike the class in Comcast, the 
class of Whirlpool consumers had been certified for liability 
purposes only, with determination of damages to be done on an 
individual basis only after, and if, Whirlpool was found liable.152 As 
such, individualized damages calculations could not scuttle 
predominance because they never had been included in the class 
certification in the first place.153 Thus, the Court’s decision in 
Comcast has “limited applica[bility]” and is inapplicable to cases 
where classes are certified for liability purposes only.154 
2.  Seventh Circuit 
A multi-state consumer class brought claims identical to those 
from In re Whirlpool against Sears and Kenmore, alleging that the 
front-loading Kenmore and Sears washing machines were defective 
and produced mold buildup.155 The district court similarly certified 
the class for liability purposes only per Rule 23(c)(4), intending the 
damages to be determined individually should liability be found156 
The case followed the exact same procedural path as In re 
Whirlpool,157 with the Supreme Court remanding both cases to the 
circuits for reconsideration.158 
Judge Richard Posner wrote the majority opinion for the 
Seventh Circuit, reaffirming the class certification and holding, as 
the Sixth Circuit had,159 that Comcast did not require 
decertification.160 He concluded that calculation of individual 
damages cannot predominate over anything when the class seeks 
certification solely for liability determination, and thus the holding 
 
 150. Id. at 845. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 860–61. 
 153. Id. at 861. 
 154. Id. at 860. 
 155. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 797 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 156. Id. at 800. 
 157. Compare In re Whirlpool, 722 F.3d 838, with Butler, 727 F.3d 796. 
 158. Compare Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014), with Whirlpool Corp. 
v. Glazier, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014). 
 159. In re Whirlpool, 722 F.3d at 860–61. 
 160. Butler, 727 F.3d at 798–800. 
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from Comcast does not apply to issue classes for liability 
purposes.161 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Thus, the washing machine cases serve to illuminate a 
mechanism to avoid grappling with the unclear morass left by 
Comcast. This Comment makes the case that the Court’s opinion is 
sloppy and unclear, arguing that this inattention to detail created 
confusion about whether individual damages calculations defeat 
predominance. Finally, this Comment highlighted an approach 
exemplified by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits: certifying the class 
for liability only. The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed 
(c)(4) and the parameters of its use, but the decision in Comcast will 
























 161. Id. at 800. 
COMCAST CORP. V. BEHREND 9/25/2014 5:05 PM 
522 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:505 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
